In this work, we introduce an active attack on a Group Key Exchange protocol by Burmester and Desmedt. The attacker obtains a copy of the shared key, which is created in a collaborative manner with the legal users in a communication group.
Introduction
Group Key Exchange (GKE) has recently been a concern mainly due to the huge development of multiparty communications that, nowadays, are applied in many networks and, in most cases, with a very light infrastructure. For this reason, distributed GKE, where members in a group collaborate to agree on a common key, is becoming very popular and there exist many approaches trying to provide effective protocols to this end (cf. [4] or [8] for example).
Some efficient solutions were introduced by Burmester and Desmedt in [1] and [2] and by Steiner et al. in [6] and [7] that extend naturally the classical Diffie-Hellman protocol ( [3] ). Both solutions were shown to be secure against a passive adversary if the Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable. However, in [5] the authors provide an active attack on one of Steiner et al.'s proposals that allows an intrusion into the communicating group, assuming control of communications of two particular parties only during the key exchange.
Motivated by this work, which exploits a weakness of the protocol consisting of the possibility to ask one of the users like an oracle, we show a similar active attack on Burmester and Desmedt's proposal ( [1] and [2] ) that presents a similar weakness. In this case, our attack requires control of the communications of only one user and, as in the case of [5] , for only the duration of the key exchange, * Second and fourth author are partially suppported by Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad grant MTM2014-54439 and Junta de Andalucia (FQM0211). Third author is partially supported by Armasuisse and Swiss National Science Foundation grant number 149716.
† University of Almeria ‡ University of Zurich which is to say that after the attack, the attacker does not need to control communications of this user to translate messages, since all users and the attacker him/herself agree on a common key. We also note that since rekeying operation in this case is carried out by rerunning the protocol completely, the attacker can repeat the strategy (not necessarily on the same user) and keep listening to all communications for an unlimited time.
The following sections describe the protocol introduced in [1] and [2] in an algebraic group setting and the active attack respectively.
The Group Key Exchange protocol
Let U i , i = 1, . . . , n be a set of parties that want to generate a shared key K. Let G be a group of prime order q. The users agree on a generator g of G and operate as follows:
. . , n, selects a random r i ∈ Z q and broadcasts z i = g ri .
Round 2. Each party
Key Computations. Each party U i , i = 1, . . . , n computes the key
In the above, indices should be interpreted modulo n. By [2, Lemma 3.1], the users U i , i = 1, . . . , n compute the same key K = g r1r2+r2r3+···+rnr1 ∈ G.
The Attack
Under the conditions of the previous sections, let U i , i = 1, . . . , n, be a set of communicating parties and let A be an active attacker that is able to take control of one of the users' communications, let us say U k . Then the attack is developed as follows.
1. Each party U i , i = 1, . . . , n, selects a random r i ∈ Z q and broadcasts z i = g ri as in round 1 of the protocol.
2.
A stops r k and, forging U k 's identity, sends to
where a is such that a − 1 is invertible in Z q .
3. At the same time, A stops the message z k+1 for U k and replaces it by z
4. U k starts round 2 and computes
, which is broadcasted.
5.
A stops X k and U k is waiting in round 2 to receive the remaining X i , i = 1, . . . , n, i = k.
6. While X k is waiting in round 2, A finishes running the GKE protocol with participants U i , i = 1, . . . , n, i = k, using A's private information a. They agree on a key K.
7.
A computes b = (a − 1) −1 mod q and computes A generates a list {h 1 , . . . , h n−3 } of elements in G and provides U k the list {X 1 , . . . , X k−1 , X k+1 , . . . , X n } given by
where indices are again taken modulo n.
Remark 3.1. Let us note that X k−1 could be any arbitrary element since this is not used to compute K k−1 . However, in a proper execution of the protocol, it holds that n i=1 X i = 1. User U k could check whether this holds. In order to avoid being detected, once we have computed all X i with i = 1, we can define
Lemma 3.2. After the active attack, all users U i , i = 1, . . . , n, and A share the same key.
Proof. It is clear from step 6 that A and U i , i = 1, . . . , n, i = k share the key K. A straightforward computation shows that
k+1 · · · X n+k−2 = K.
